I thought I’d serialize my new Notre Dame Law Review article, “Original Meaning and the Freedom of Speech and Press:…
The post “Original Meaning and the Freedom of Speech and Press”: “Broad Evidence, and Silently Consistent Precedents” appeared first on Reason Magazine.
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I thought I’d serialize my new Notre Dame Law Review article, “Original Meaning and the Freedom of Speech and Press: Some Illustrative Examples”; here’s the first Part:
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In certain areas, First Amendment precedent turns out to be quite consistent with original meaning—even though the Court hasn’t squarely discussed historical evidence in any detail. This might be a fortunate accident, or perhaps a random coincidence in the policy judgments of the modern Court and the Framing generation. But I expect that some at least stems from a phenomenon that Justice Scalia discussed in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission (1995): “Principles of liberty fundamental enough to have been embodied within constitutional guarantees are not readily erased from the Nation’s consciousness. A governmental practice that has become general throughout the United States, and particularly one that has the validation of long, accepted usage, bears a strong presumption of constitutionality.”
In some situations, this observation may not be accurate. But in others, there really does appear to be a longstanding constitutional understanding that has become so much part of the law that a court that simply follows doctrine will incorporate original meaning. Let me offer three examples.
A. “The Liberty of the Press Is Not Confined to Newspapers and Periodicals”
The Supreme Court has generally held that the First Amendment equally protects all who speak to the public, whether they are professional media (e.g., newspaper publishers or reporters) or nonprofessionals (e.g., leafletters). In this respect, it has treated “the freedom … of the press” as protecting the press as technology—the use of the printing press and its technological heirs—rather than the press as industry, in the sense of people whose daily job is writing for the public.
Now the original articulation of this position in the Supreme Court came in Lovell v. City of Griffin (1938), with little historical analysis:
The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets. These indeed have been historic weapons in the defense of liberty, as the pamphlets of Thomas Paine and others in our own history abundantly attest. The press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion.
And this is so even though the Court had shown an interest in Framing-era history. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson (1931) discussed that history in striking down an injunction against the operation of a “scandalous” newspaper. Grosjean v. American Press Co. (1936) discussed history in considerably more detail in holding unconstitutional a selective tax on certain newspapers.
More recently, Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Citizens United v. FEC (2010) offered a bit more historical analysis:
The dissent … interpret[s] the Freedom of the Press Clause to refer to the institutional press (thus demonstrating, according to the dissent, that the Founders “did draw distinctions—explicit distinctions—between types of ‘speakers,’ or speech outlets or forms”). It is passing strange to interpret the phrase “the freedom of speech, or of the press” to mean, not everyone’s right to speak or publish, but rather everyone’s right to speak or the institutional press’s right to publish. No one thought that is what it meant. Patriot Noah Webster’s 1828 dictionary contains, under the word “press,” the following entry:
“Liberty of the press, in civil policy, is the free right of publishing books, pamphlets or papers without previous restraint; or the unrestrained right which every citizen enjoys of publishing his thoughts and opinions, subject only to punishment for publishing what is pernicious to morals or to the peace of the state.”
As the Court’s opinion describes, our jurisprudence agrees with Noah Webster and contradicts the dissent.
“The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets…. The press in its historical connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion.”
But this is still predominantly a precedential analysis, with one textual argument and one early republican source.
At the same time, the foundational case in the Court—Lovell—followed 150 years of established practice, to the point that the Court might not have seen the need to do more than just nod to “[t]he press in its historic connotation.”
As I’ve laid out elsewhere, Framing-era legal sources, such as cases, treatises, and constitutional provisions, articulated the freedom of the press as extending to everyone, not just to professional newspaper publishers. {See generally Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or for the Press as a Technology? From the Framing to Today, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 459 (2012) [hereinafter Volokh, Freedom for the Press]; Eugene Volokh, The Press Clause: Important, Remembered, and Equally Shared, 5 J. Free Speech L. 659 (2025).} Then, starting in the 1820s, courts began to expressly hold that newspaper printers’ and editors’ rights were equal to everyone else’s. In the following decades, that was repeated in case after case throughout the country. By the time Lovell was decided, the principle was well-established in the precedents, and, to my knowledge, unanimously so. The original meaning had made its way into well-settled doctrine and was then ratified by the Court in Lovell.
The original meaning also fit with practice, which took place in the shadow of the law but which likely also affected the law. In the Framing era, many influential Americans published their views using the printing press, whether in pamphlets or as submissions to newspapers. It would be odd to think that they would have secured special constitutional rights to the just-emerging category of newspapermen, who were in some measure lower status than they were, while denying the same rights to themselves.
And though those newspapers became relatively more influential in the following centuries, a tradition of leafletting and pamphleteering continued. The Court in 1938 could see the media reality as well as media law and naturally view the nonprofessional leafletter as having the same free press rights as a professional newspaper editor.
B. Symbolic Expression
The very first case in which the Supreme Court struck down government action as violating constitutional rights of freedom of expression, Stromberg v. California (1931), involved neither the press nor speech in the literal sense. Rather, it involved what one might today call symbolic expression (or expressive conduct)—the display of a red flag as a revolutionary symbol.
But the opinion never discussed why displaying a flag counted as “speech” or “press.” The opinion below similarly assumed that symbolic expression was as protected as verbal expression, and so did the parties’ briefs in the Supreme Court. The Court had neither before nor since analyzed whether this result is consistent with the original meaning of the free expression guarantees. {See Eugene Volokh, Symbolic Expression and the Original Meaning of the First Amendment, 97 Geo. L.J. 1057 (2009).}
Likewise, the 1920 California Supreme Court decision in Ex parte Hartman (1920) struck down an earlier law banning the possession or display of flags that represented efforts “espous[ing] for the government of … the United States of America … principles or theories of government antagonistic … to the form of the government thereof as now constituted.” The court concluded that Americans have “the right to advocate peaceable changes in our Constitution, laws or form of government,” and that therefore “an organization peaceably advocating such changes may adopt a flag … signifying its purpose, and that the display or possession of such flag … cannot be made an unlawful act.” The court simply assumed that symbolic expression was constitutionally equivalent to verbal expression, without discussing the matter further.
But while these assumptions weren’t backed by any originalist analysis, they appear to have been fully consistent with the Framing-era understanding that symbolic expression, pictorial expression, and verbal expression were generally treated as functionally equivalent. This equivalence was most often drawn with regard to restrictions on expression, such as defamation law. But it was also the view taken in the early republic with regard to constitutional protections for expression.
Thus, for instance, pre-Revolutionary libel law recognized the category of libel by “pictures, signs, and the like”—meaning through symbols, whether printed or physically displayed—as tantamount to libel by writing. Early American law did the same, extending the same principle to incitement to riot as well. Early treatises drew this equivalence. Early court decisions suggested that pictorial and symbolic expression was potentially pro




