Home » “Original Meaning and the Freedom of Speech and Press”: “Scant Evidence: Provoking a Riot”

“Original Meaning and the Freedom of Speech and Press”: “Scant Evidence: Provoking a Riot”

I’m serializing my new Notre Dame Law Review article, “Original Meaning and the Freedom of Speech and Press: Some Illustrative…
The post “Original Meaning and the Freedom of Speech and Press”: “Scant Evidence: Provoking a Riot” appeared first on Reason Magazine.

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I’m serializing my new Notre Dame Law Review article, “Original Meaning and the Freedom of Speech and Press: Some Illustrative Examples”; here’s the second Part:

Let me turn now to a different question, as to which the evidence is intriguing but scant: Was freedom of expression understood as including expression that created resentment that risked provoking riots? (This question has of course arisen often more recently, in cases such as Terminiello v. Chicago (1949) and Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement (1992).) In fact, I hadn’t seen any evidence until I came across one early case, which has been apparently virtually undiscussed during the last fifty years, perhaps because it’s not on Westlaw or Lexis.

The case is Commonwealth v. Haines (1824), a decision by Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice John Gibson (later the Chief Justice), apparently sitting alone as a trial judge. Haines had been accused of intentionally causing a riot by “erecting and fixing, a certain figure, resembling a man, commonly called a Paddy, as and for the effigy of St. Patrick … with the accompaniment of a rum bottle and a string of potatoes,” in “a neighborhood inhabited principally by emigrants from Ireland.” “[T]he exhibition of a Paddy was resented as an insult upon the Catholic portion of the Irish ….”

The main legal complication was that defendants’ involvement in displaying the Paddy was disputed, but there was no dispute that the defendant had displayed a “Shelah”—”a female figure … with several features, besides that of sex, distinguishing it from a Paddy.” Such a Shelah was apparently “often displayed as a retaliatory emblem” to the Paddy.

After deliberating for some time, the jury asked whether it could convict based on a finding that defendant was involved in exhibiting the Shelah rather than the Paddy. Justice Gibson “answered in effect, that, if the characteristics and object of the Shelah were different from those of the Paddy, the variance [from the indictment] was fatal; but that the question of the identity or dissimilarity of the two was for the jury.” (The jury ultimately acquitted.) Indeed, of the sources that cite Haines, a considerable fraction does so on this question of how far the proof may diverge from the indictment.

But Justice Gibson also charged the jury thus:

The offence specified in the first count, is clearly indictable at common law. No man has a right to trifle with the feelings of any large class of men, so as to provoke them to a breach of the peace. If it is done by libel, no one doubts it is a misdemeanor; if it is done by effigy is it less so? Suppose the defendant had published a picture of the same character, and with the same tendency as the figure which is the subject of the present offence, would it not be held a libel? The gist of the offence, is its tendency to provoke a breach of the peace. It may be indiscreet in the Irish residents of the district to take notice of acts of the kind; but it is worse than indiscreet in others to provoke them to do so.

So here’s a case from the early republic on when speech can be punished. And it is possibly a case that bears on the original meaning of “the freedom of speech,” if Justice Gibson was correct not just about Pennsylvania 1824 law but about the “common law” more broadly.

In principle, the case might therefore bear on important First Amendment debates. One might ask whether it would, for instance, justify restrictions on flag burning, on the theory that flag burning likewise “trifle[s] with the feelings of [a] large class of men, so as to provoke them to a breach of the peace.”

Or one might ask how the case bears more broadly on Justice Scalia’s observation in McIntyre that “[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.” (Justice Scalia was explaining there why he thought flag burning was constitutionally protected, despite the presence of a contrary tradition, dating back to 1890 and the following decades, of flag burning bans.) Perhaps such protection for offensive messages, at least when publicly displayed in order to offend, is not indeed a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment.

One might also inquire into the scope of the principle that Justice Gibson was invoking. Does it apply only to situations where the action does provoke a riot, as it apparently did in Haines? Is it enough if it has a tendency to provoke a riot? Is it enough if it provokes or has a tendency to provoke a “breach of the peace,” which might be as little as just a fight between one viewer and the provoker?

Is the principle limited to purposeful provocation (which the phrase “trifle with the feelings” might suggest), so that engaging in well-motivated but offensive speech wouldn’t be punishable? Compare Respublica v. Dennie (1805), an 1805 Pennsylvania seditious libel case: The court there held that criticizing the government with the purpose to subvert the Constitution of the United States could be punished as seditious libel—but criticism “honestly meant to inform the public mind, and warn them against supposed dangers in society, though the subject may have been treated erroneously” was constitutionally protected.

The trouble is that Haines appears to be the only case from that era that considered the matter. I’ve done a good deal of research on early American cases dealing with speech restrictions, but I haven’t found any others. Haines doesn’t cite any relevant precedents. I couldn’t find any cases that in turn cite Haines until 1899, and that case and the few later cases citing Haines didn’t squarely deal with the issue. {The first case I could find that cited in Haines in dealing with speech that allegedly incited a riot was Commonwealth v. Spartaco (Pa. Super. Ct. 1932), which involved a defendant loudly expostulating against a visit of Benito Mussolini’s foreign minister, Dino Grandi (who would later be known for introducing the resolution that effectively removed Mussolini from office in 1943). The judge in Spartaco interpreted Haines as covering words said “with intent to provoke a riot or with a reckless and willful disregard of their probable outcome in that respect.”}

What can courts make of an isolated case such as this one? Perhaps one can view it as being connected to the early cases upholding blasphemy laws, but their rationales are actually quite different: The blasphemy cases, for instance, do not generally rest on any concern about rioting. As it stands, we have an intriguing understanding of what the law perhaps was at the time—or perhaps not.

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